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INTRODUCTION 
Before the late 1980’s an individual never left home 
without two essential items: their keys and wallet.  Since that 
time, a third item has emerged: the cell phone.  In June 2011, 
there were more than 320 million wireless subscribers in the 
United States, which constitutes one-hundred-and-two 
percent of the American population.1  In fact, twenty-nine 
percent of all households in the United States are now 
wireless only.2  Further, cellular service providers have 
 1. Wireless Quick Facts: Mid-Year Figures, CTIA-THE WIRELESS 
ASSOCIATION, http://www.ctia.org/media/industry_info/index.cfm/AID/10323 
(last visited Dec. 30, 2011). 
 2. Id. 
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sought to make a cell phone user’s keys and wallet obsolete by 
developing cell phones that double as both a car key and a 
method of payment, so that all the user requires in his daily 
life is his cell phone.3 
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the cell phone is 
that it is with us everywhere we go, making us available to 
both our colleagues and loved ones, as well as making them—
and now the Internet—available to us.4  In addition, location-
based cell phone applications, such as Foursquare5 and the 
“Places” feature on Facebook,6 have capitalized on the fact 
that a cell phone is always with the user and the user’s desire 
to share his location with others.7  In order for a cell phone to 
properly function (i.e., make and receive calls or transmit 
data) it must be in constant connection with the cellular 
network.8  As a cell phone communicates with the nearest cell 
towers, the cellular network records and stores this data, 
called cell-site location information (CSLI) in order for the 
network—and sometimes other users—to locate the cell 
phone.9 
 3. See Michael Fitzgerald, Use Your Cell Phone Instead of Your Credit 
Card, PC WORLD, (Sept. 19, 2005, 1:00 AM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/122590/use_your_cell_phone__instead_of_your_c
redit_card.html (reviewing various cell phone technologies that permit the user 
to link their credit card to his cell phone and thereby use his cell as a means of 
payment); Brian X. Chen, Japanese Cell Phone Doubles as Car Key, WIRED, 
(Sept. 24, 2008, 5:11 PM), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2008/09/ 
japanese-cell-p/ (reviewing a cell phone offering a car key function  developed by 
Sharp and Nissan). 
 4.  See M. Wesley Clark, Cell Phones as Tracking Devices, 41 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 1413, 1413 (2007). 
 5. See FOURSQUARE, http://foursquare.com/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2011) 
(allowing a user to “check in” at stores, restaurants, and other establishments, 
share this information with friends and earn a “badge” for the frequency with 
which the user visits those locations).  
 6. See FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/places/ (last visited Jan. 7, 
2011) (allowing the user to utilize the location-based feature to “share where 
they are,” “connect with friends” and “find local deals”).  
 7. See Kathryn Zickuhr & Aaron Smith, 4% of online Americans use 
location-based services, PEW INTERNET (Nov. 4, 2010), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Location-based-services.aspx (stating 
that four percent of online Americans use location-based software services). 
 8. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act Reform: Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on Judiciary, 
111th Cong. 40 (2010) [hereinafter May Hearings] (statement of Prof. Orin 
Kerr). 
 9. See id. 
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Because a cell phone is always with the user, the CSLI 
records generated by a cellular network can provide a wealth 
of information about the individual user.10  Understandably, 
law enforcement considers CSLI to be a very powerful 
investigative tool.11  Magistrate Judge Stephen Wm. Smith, 
who testified before Congress in June 2010 and oversees 
applications for CSLI, estimates that the total number of 
electronic surveillance orders issued at the federal level 
exceeds 10,000 per year.12  While early CSLI jurisprudence 
focused on prospective (real-time) CSLI,13 recently the focus 
has shifted to historical CSLI14 (the records of the 
 10. See ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies 
and Services: Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of 
the H. Comm. on Judiciary, 111th Cong. 60 (2010) [hereinafter June Hearings] 
(statement of Richard Littlehale, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, F.B.I.). 
 11. See id. 
 12. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Reform: Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on Judiciary, 
111th Cong. 80 (2010) [hereinafter Smith, May Hearings] (statement of Hon. 
Stephen Wm. Smith).  The exact number of electronic surveillance orders 
granted under the ECPA is unknown.  Id.  The Attorney General is required to 
report to Congress the number of pen registers requested.  18 U.S.C. § 3126 
(2011).  There is no sister reporting requirement for information obtained under 
§ 2703.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2011). 
 13. In re Application of the United States of America for an Order 
Authorizing the Installation and Use of the Pen Register Device, a Trap and 
Trace Device, and for Geographic Location Information, 497 F. Supp. 2d 301 
(D.P.R. 2007); In re Application of the United States for an Order for 
Prospective Cell Site Location Information on a Certain Cellular Telephone, 460 
F. Supp. 2d 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Application of the United States of 
America for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen 
Register and Trap and Trace Device; (2) Authorizing the release of Subscriber 
and Other Information; and (3) authorizing the disclosure of Location-Based 
Services, In re Application of the United States of America for an Order: (1) 
Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace 
Device; (2) Authorizing the Release of Subscriber and Other Information; and 
(3) Location of Cell Site Origination and/or Termination, Case Nos. 1:06-MC-6, 
1:06-MC-7, 2006 WL 1876847 (N.D. Ind. July 5, 2006); In re Application of The 
United States for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen 
Register and Trap and Trace Device; and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber 
Info. and/or Cell Site Info., 411 F. Supp. 2d 678 (W.D. La. 2006); In re 
Application of the United States of America for an Order for Disclosure of 
Telecommunications Records and Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and 
Trap and Trace, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Application for Pen 
Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Authority, 396 F. Supp. 
2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005); see also Kevin McLaughlin, Note, Fourth Amendment 
and Cell Phone Location Tracking: Where are We?, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. 
L.J. 421 (2007) (reviewing prospective CSLI jurisprudence). 
 14. United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 WL 
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communication between the cell phone and the cellular 
network generated and retained by a cellular service 
provider).15  When discussing historical CSLI, many early 
cases and law review articles agreed that the information was 
obtainable under a lesser standard of proof than prospective 
CSLI.16 
Recently, the Third Circuit became the first United 
States Court of Appeals to decide what the appropriate 
standard of proof was for law enforcement to obtain historical 
CSLI under the Stored Communications Act (SCA) and the 
Fourth Amendment, but the mixed result of the case does not 
answer the question convincingly.17  Frustrated by Fourth 
4200156 (N.D. Ga Apr. 21, 2008); In re Application of the United States of 
America for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen 
Register and Trap and Trace Device, and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber 
and Other Info., 622 F. Supp. 2d 411 (S.D. Tex. 2007); In re Applications of the 
United States of America for an Order Authorizing Continued use of a Pen 
Register and Trap and Trace with Caller Identification Device and Cell Site 
Auth. on Tel. No. (XXX) XXX-XXXX and any Subsequently Assigned Tel. No., 
530 F. Supp. 2d 367 (D. Mass. 2007); In re Applications of the United States of 
America for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2703(d), 
509 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D. Mass. 2007); see also Patrick T. Chamberlin, Note, Court 
Ordered Disclosure of Historical Cell Site Location Information: The Argument 
for a Probable Cause Standard, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1745 (2009) (reviewing 
historical CSLI jurisprudence). 
 15. See May Hearings, supra note 8, at 34 (statement of Prof. Orin Kerr). 
 16. See Suarez-Blanca, 2008 WL 4200156 (denying defendant’s motion to 
suppress historical CSLI evidence that had been ordered disclosed by a 
magistrate judge under the Stored Communications Act standard); In re 
Application of the United States of America for an Order: (1) Authorizing the 
Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, and (2) 
Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other Info., 622 F. Supp. 2d 411 (S.D. 
Tex. 2007) (granting government access to both prospective and historical 
CSLI); In re Applications of the United States of America for an Order 
Authorizing Continued use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace with Caller 
Identification Device and Cell Site Auth. on Tel. No. (XXX) XXX-XXXX and any 
Subsequently Assigned Tel. No., 530 F. Supp. 2d 367 (D. Mass. 2007) (denying 
government access to prospective CSLI and granting government access to 
historical CSLI); In re Applications of the United States of America for Orders 
Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76 
(D. Mass. 2007) (granting government access to historical CSLI);  see also Adam 
Koppel, Warranting a Warrant:  Fourth Amendment Concerns Raised by Law 
Enforcement’s Warrantless Use of GPS and Cellular Phone Tracking, 64 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 1061, 1068–69 (2010) (stating that historical CSLI is limited in 
value and produces a lower level of concern from privacy advocates). 
 17. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order 
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 
620 F.3d 304, 316 (3d Cir. 2010) (concluding that the SCA provides a “sliding 
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Amendment precedent and the current statutory framework, 
the Third Circuit concluded: “The considerations for and 
against such a requirement [a lesser standard of proof for 
historical CSLI] would be for Congress to balance.  A court is 
not the appropriate forum for such balancing, and we decline 
to take a step as to which Congress is silent.”18 
Congress answered that call.  In May, June, and 
September of 2010, Congress held fact-finding hearings to 
determine what changes needed to be made to the existing 
statutory framework.19  The goals of Congress in creating new 
legislation on this topic were to balance an individual’s right 
to privacy with the government’s need to obtain evidence to 
prevent and investigate crime and respond to emergency 
circumstances.20  In May 2011, Senator Leahy of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee introduced a bill in the U.S. Senate to 
amend the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (of which 
the SCA is a smaller part).21  The legislation has been sent to 
the Senate Judiciary Committee and is currently being 
considered in the 112th Congress, First Session.22  The 
potential impact of the proposed legislation will be discussed 
in Part III.A. 
In addition, just before publication of this Comment the 
Supreme Court issued its decision in the GPS tracking case 
United States v. Jones (formerly known as United States v. 
Maynard).  The Court’s decision in that case and the 
implications of the decision for historical CSLI jurisprudence 
scale” by which a judge can, at his or her discretion, grant an order for historical 
CSLI or require a warrant). 
 18. Id. at 319. 
 19. See May Hearings, supra note 8 (statement of Prof. Orin Kerr); June 
Hearings, supra note 10; The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: 
Promoting Security and Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age: Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the Sen. Comm. on Judiciary, 
111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter September Hearings]. 
 20. September Hearings, supra note 19, Prepared Statement at 1 
(Statement of James X. Dempsey, Esq., V.P., Center for Democracy and 
Technology) available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/10-09-22Dempsey 
Testimony.pdf.  Another goal of Congress is to instill consumer confidence in 
communications technology.  Id. 
 21. Rachelle Dragani, US Senate Sinks its Teeth into Online Privacy 
Reform, TECHNEWSWORLD (May 18, 2011, 11:40 AM), http://www.technews 
world.com/story/72477.html. 
 22. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, S. 
1011, 112th Cong. (2011). 
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will be discussed in Part III.B.   
The subject of this Comment is historical CSLI generated 
through cell phone calls.23  Using the current statutory 
framework, Fourth Amendment precedent, and previous 
CSLI case law, this Comment suggests a new legal 
framework for the standard of proof required to obtain 
historical CSLI.  This approach focuses on the user’s active 
versus idle use of a cell phone.  When a phone is in active 
use—such as when making or receiving a call—the 
information should be obtainable under a “specific and 
articulable facts standard,” which is a lesser standard of proof 
than for a warrant.24  However, when the phone is idle, the 
data generated by the cellular network should only be 
accessible under a probable cause standard.25  An active use 
distinction will help to simplify how the current statutory 
framework is applied to historical CSLI and provide a 
workable solution that comfortably meshes with the existing 
statutes.  In addition, this proposal will unify Fourth 
Amendment precedents that at times conflict. 
First, Section I will discuss how the technology of CSLI 
works, what kind of data is stored by cellular service 
providers, what changes can be expected from advancements 
in future technology, and how law enforcement uses the 
data.26  Next, the Comment will discuss the current statutory 
framework, Fourth Amendment precedent, and existing 
historical CSLI jurisprudence.27  Section II will identify the 
legal problem to be discussed28 and will analyze historical 
CSLI under the existing statutory framework and Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.29  Section III will discuss the 
proposed solution to the current legal problem30 followed by 
the conclusion.31 
 23. Text messages are outside the scope of this Comment: law enforcement 
requests for historical CSLI often do not request text message information.  See 
supra notes 13, 14, 16. 
 24. See infra pp. 11–12. 
 25. See infra pp. 11–12. 
 26. See infra Part I.A–B. 
 27. See infra Part I.C–E. 
 28. See infra Part II.A. 
 29. See infra Part II.A.4–B. 
 30. See infra Part III. 
 31. See infra Conclusion. 
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 150 Side B      04/16/2012   17:10:32
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 150 Side B      04/16/2012   17:10:32
5_FRASER FINAL.DOC 3/15/2012  8:03:15 PM 
578 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION: WHAT IS HISTORICAL CELL-
SITE LOCATION INFORMATION? 
A. How Cell Phones Connect to the Cellular Network 
In order for the cellular network to connect incoming 
calls to a user’s cell phone and for the user to make outgoing 
calls, the cell phone must constantly relay its location to the 
nearest cell tower32 and other towers close by.33  Each phone 
has a Mobile Identification Number (MIN)—a ten-digit 
number that another user dials to call the phone; and an 
Electronic Serial Number (ESN)—a unique, unchangeable 
number assigned by the manufacturer.34  Through a process 
called “registration,” which occurs approximately every seven 
seconds, a cell phone identifies itself to the cellular network 
by relaying its MIN and ESN to the nearest tower and other 
towers nearby.35  The phone registers with the cell tower that 
has the strongest radio signal, as well as up to six other cell 
towers nearby.36  The cell phone then sorts and ranks these 
towers according to which signal is the strongest and the 
weakest.37 This process occurs continuously and 
automatically as long as the phone is turned on.38  The signals 
sent during registration are transmitted on a separate 
frequency, distinct from those that transmit voice and data to 
 32. The basic composition of a cell phone network is a series of grids and 
networks.  The cell tower (base station) is the smallest part of each grid, which 
is controlled by a base station controller.  Each base station controller reports to 
a larger network called a Location Area Code (LAC).  Each LAC could contain 
anywhere from 100 to 125 cell towers, and is controlled by a mobile switching 
center (MTSO), where all types of data are recorded.  Transcript of Record at 7–
8, United States v. Sims, No. 06-674 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2007) (testimony of 
William Shute), available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/celltracking 
/shutetestimony.pdf [hereinafter Shute Testimony]. 
 33. See McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 426. 
 34. See Note, Who Knows Where You’ve Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding 
the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 309 
[hereinafter Who Knows Where You’ve Been]. 
 35. McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 426; June Hearings, supra note 10, at 13 
(statement of Prof. Matt Blaze). 
 36. See McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 426; June Hearings, supra note 10, at 
13 (statement of Prof. Matt Blaze). 
 37. June Hearings, supra note 10, at 13 (statement of Prof. Matt Blaze); 
Shute Testimony, supra note 32, at 11. 
 38. McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 426. 
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the phone.39  As the user and the phone move through the 
cellular network, the cell phone continually sorts and ranks 
the nearest cell towers as the connection to one tower grows 
weaker and the connection to another tower grows stronger.  
This information is used by the cellular-telephone service 
provider (CSP) to locate the phone within the cellular 
network whenever the cell phone receives a call.40  When the 
user is called, the CSP sends a signal through the entire 
cellular network, which locates the phone based on where it 
last registered.41  A similar process works in reverse when the 
user makes a call.42 
1. The Level of Information Retained and Stored by 
Cellular Service Providers 
Historical CSLI is “non-content” information: information 
that the cellular network generates and uses in order to 
deliver the call, as opposed to the content of the 
conversation.43  Every cellular-telephone service provider 
(CSP) stores this information, but the amount of information 
stored by each CSP depends on the technology,44 and the 
business decisions that each company makes regarding data 
retention.45  Historical CSLI stored by wireless providers can 
 39. Id. 
 40. McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 426; Shute Testimony, supra note 32, at 
8; June Hearings, supra note 10, at 13 (statement of Prof. Matt Blaze).  The cell 
towers measure the strength of the signal using either one or both of the two 
methods to measure the signal strength, Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) or 
Angle of Arrival (AOA).  TDOA measures the amount of time that it takes for 
the signal from a tower to travel to a user’s phone, and from this measurement 
it is possible to estimate the distance between the tower and phone because 
radio waves move at a constant rate.  AOA measures the angle at which the 
phone’s signal arrives at the tower and uses that information to calculate the 
approximate location of the phone.  Based on these measurements, the MTSO 
will then direct the phone to switch to the nearest tower with the strongest 
signal.  See Who Knows Where You’ve Been, supra note 34, at 308–09. 
 41. See Shute Testimony, supra note 32, at 8. 
 42. McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 426. 
 43. See May Hearings, supra note 8, at 34 (statement of Prof. Orin Kerr). 
 44. Most, if not all cellular telephone service providers (CSPs) use one of 
three different technologies, which all operate in essentially the same fashion.  
T-Mobile and AT&T use Global Standard Mobile Communications (GSM), 
Verizon and Sprint use Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), and Nextel uses 
Integrated Digital Enhanced Network (IDEN).  Shute Testimony, supra note 32, 
at 4–5. 
 45. Id. 
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be separated into two categories: limited CSLI, which is the 
data created during the beginning and end of a call, and 
unlimited CSLI, which is all of the signaling information 
collected during the call and when the phone is idle.46 
While most, if not all, wireless providers record and store 
limited CSLI,47 others may also store unlimited CSLI48—
including regularly updated, accurate location information.49  
As an example of what kind of information is stored, in 2009 
Nextel stored the date, time, and duration of the calls as well 
as the cell tower when the call is made, the cell tower in the 
event of a change, and the cell tower when the call is 
terminated.50  Historical CSLI is stored for long periods of 
time because it is extremely useful to CSP.51  This 
information is used by CSPs for business, marketing and 
technical purposes.52 
2. Current Cell Tower Configurations and Continued 
Growth 
Cell towers can only handle a certain number of calls at a 
given time depending on the amount of radio spectrum 
bandwidth allocated to the CSP.53  As a result, in more 
 46. June Hearings, supra note 10, at 99 (statement of Hon. Stephen Wm. 
Smith). 
 47. See Albert Gidari, Jr., Companies Caught in the Middle, 41 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 535, 549 (2007). 
 48. See ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 
OF JUSTICE 42 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/foia/docs/elec-
sur-manual.pdf.  
 49. See June Hearings, supra note 10, at 27 (statement of Prof. Matt Blaze). 
 50. Shute Testimony, supra note 32, at 10, 12–13.   Additionally, how long 
the data is stored depends on the service provider and the technology.  In 
general, given the low cost of storing data and the invaluable use of the data 
(discussed below), many service providers store the data as long as possible.  
Some providers divide their records into two classes: “billing records,” which 
comprise the records of incoming and outgoing calls and the tower location that 
served them, and “maintenance records,” which may include far more detailed 
information, such as records of when subscribers’ handsets move through the 
network even when no calls are being made.  See also May Hearings, supra note 
8, at 34 (statement of Prof. Orin Kerr); June Hearings, supra note 10, at 16, 135 
(statement of Prof. Matt Blaze). 
 51. See June Hearings, supra note 10, at 16 (statement of Prof. Matt Blaze). 
 52. Shute Testimony, supra note 32, at 10.  Technically, the information 
tells CSP’s where old infrastructure is redundant and where new infrastructure 
is needed.  Marketing and business wise, the information is used to see how 
customers are using their phones.  See June Hearings, supra note 10, at 16, 95. 
 53. See June Hearings, supra note 10, at 15, 26. 
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densely populated areas, the cell towers must be closer 
together in order to accommodate the increased number of 
users in that area.54  New cellular data services such as 3G 
and 4G internet create similar pressure on the available 
spectrum bandwidth, usually requiring more densely 
populated cell towers.55  In rural areas, there may be cell 
towers in a configuration covering several miles in diameter; 
but the trend in urban areas has been to install cell towers in 
increasingly smaller service areas called microcells, picocells 
and femtocells, which serve very specific locations, such as a 
floor of a building or even an individual room, such as a 
waiting room.56 
B. Law Enforcement Uses of Cell-Site Location Information: 
What Does it all Mean? 
First, it is important to understand what kind of 
information is sought by law enforcement from CSPs through 
the SCA.  Law enforcement requests for CSLI vary greatly.  
Sometimes historical CSLI requests are only for limited 
CSLI57 and other times are for unlimited CSLI as well;58 other 
orders can be unclear as to what kind of information is being 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 26. 
 56. Id. at 15–16. 
 57. See, e.g., In re Application of the United States for an Order: (1) 
Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace 
Device; and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or Cell Site Info., 
411 F. Supp. 2d 678, 679 (W.D. La. 2006) (requesting “the location of the cell 
site/sector (physical address) at call origination (for outbound calling), call 
termination (for incoming calls) and, if reasonably available, during the 
progress of a call for the subject telephone number.”). 
 58. See In re Application of the United States of America for Historical Cell 
Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (“Each application identically 
defined the requested information as ’the antenna tower and sector to which the 
cell phone sends its signal, specifically including the cellsite/sector(s) used by 
the mobile telephone to obtain service for a call or when in an idle state.’  In 
other words, the Government seeks continuous location data to track the target 
phone over a two month period, whether the phone was in active use or not.”); 
In re Application of the United States of America for an Order: (1) Authorizing 
the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, and (2) 
Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other Info., 622 F. Supp. 2d 411, 412 n.1 
(S.D. Tex. 2007) (stating in the request that “call detail records also include a 
record of incoming calls and the cellsite/sector(s) used by the mobile telephone 
to obtain service for a call or when in an idle state.”). 
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requested.59  The time period over which CSLI records are 
requested can also vary dramatically.60 
CSLI is most useful to law enforcement to show with 
whom a suspect communicates, from where, at what time, 
and for how long.61  Law enforcement analyzes historical 
CSLI by looking at what cell tower the phone is 
communicating with, and what the signal strength of that call 
was.62  If the phone communicates with a single tower during 
the entire duration of the call, the phone is in very close 
proximity to the tower.63  If the phone shifts between two 
different cell towers during the course of a call, the phone is 
in the middle of an overlapping area of coverage between the 
two different cell towers.64  The advantages of using CSLI as 
opposed to other location-based technologies is that many, if 
not all, adults already have a cell phone and law enforcement 
is therefore spared the trouble of having to install the device 
on the suspect’s car or person.65  CSLI is useful in instances 
where law enforcement does not yet have probable cause (the 
standard of proof required for a warrant).66  This information 
is often used as a “stepping stone” for officers to request 
authorization from courts for more intrusive types of 
surveillance and searches, such as a wiretap authorized by a 
warrant.67 
 59. See, e.g., In re Application of the United States of America for an Order: 
(1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; (2) 
Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other Info.; and (3) Authorizing the 
Disclosure of Location-Base Services, 727 F. Supp. 2d. 571 (W.D. Tex. 2010) 
(failing to adequately state what kind of CSLI is being requested). 
 60. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order 
Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information, No. 11-MC-0113, 
2011 WL 679925 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011) (requesting a 3 day period, a 6 day 
period, and a 12 day period); In re Application of the United States of America 
for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information, No. 10-
MC-0897, 2010 WL 5437209, at *1 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2010) (requesting 113 
days). 
 61. September Hearings, supra note 19, at 59 (statement of James A. Baker, 
Associate Deputy Att’y Gen.). 
 62. See Shute Testimony, supra note 32, at 19–20. 
 63. See id. at 22. 
 64. See id. at 8. 
 65. See Clark, supra note 4, at 1413. 
 66. See id. at 1414. 
 67. June Hearings, supra note 10, at 57 (statement of Richard Littlehale, 
Assistant SAC, F.B.I.); The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: 
Government Perspectives on Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 112th Cong. 4 
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C. Stored Communications Act: Law Enforcement Access to 
Historical Cell-Site Location Information 
To acquire historical CSLI law enforcement must obtain 
a court order requiring a CSP to disclose the information.68  
Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(ECPA), known as the Stored Communications Act, regulates 
government access to wire and electronic communications.69  
The standard of proof required under the SCA for law 
enforcement to obtain historical CSLI, as well as the precise 
application of the statute to historical CSLI remains 
uncertain.  First, an overview of the statutory scheme is 
essential. 
The primary statute that governs the disclosure of CSLI 
is 18 U.S.C. § 2703.70  Section 2703(c)(1) provides in pertinent 
part: 
(c) Records concerning electronic communication service or 
remote computing service. (1) A governmental entity may 
require a provider of electronic communication service or 
remote computing service to disclose a record or other 
information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of 
such service (not including the contents of 
communications) . . . .71 
In order for historical CSLI to be available under 18 U.S.C. § 
2703(c)(1), three qualifications must be met: first, the CSP 
must be a provider of an electronic communication service; 
second, the data may not be content information as defined in 
18 U.S.C. § 2510(8); and third, the data must be a “record or 
other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer 
of” an electronic communications service.72 
First, the CSP must be a provider of an “electronic 
communication service.”  Under the SCA, in order to qualify 
(2011) [hereinafter April Hearings] (statement of James A. Baker, Associate 
Deputy Att’y Gen.). 
 68. McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 428. 
 69. See June Hearings, supra note 10, at 2 (statement of F. James 
Sensenbrenner, Rep. WI). 
 70. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2011). 
 71. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) 2011 (emphasis added). 
 72. In re Applications of the United States of America for Orders Pursuant 
to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 79–80 (D. 
Mass. 2007).  Content information is governed by sections 2703(a)?(b).  See 18 
U.S.C. § 2703(a)–(b) (2011). 
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as an electronic communications service provider the CSP 
must provide users with the ability to “send or receive wire or 
electronic communications.”73  A wire communication is: 
[A]ny aural transfer made in whole or in part through the 
use of facilities for the transmission of communications by 
the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the 
point of origin and the point of reception . . . furnished or 
operated by any person engaged in providing or operating 
such facilities . . . .74 
The Act defines an electronic communication as “any transfer 
of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence 
of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, 
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system.”75  
There is little debate that historical CSLI qualifies as one or 
both of these definitions,76 but which definition CSLI is 
categorized as has been the subject of litigation.77  Second the 
data may not be content information under the meaning of 
the SCA.  The SCA defines content as “any information 
concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that 
communication.”78  Historical CSLI falls outside of the 
definition of content, and instead is classified as a “record  
or other information pertaining to a subscriber . . . or 
customer.”79 
Third, the data must be a “record or other information 
pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of,” an electronic 
communications service.80  Neither the term “record” nor 
“information” is defined by the SCA, but in the relevant 
context courts have found record to mean something stored or 
 73. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2011). 
 74. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1). 
 75. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). 
 76. See In re Applications of the United States of America for Orders 
Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 
79–80 (D. Mass. 2007). 
 77. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order 
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 
620 F.3d 304, 309–10 (3d Cir. 2010); Chamberlin, supra note 14, at 1775–76. 
 78. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2011). 
 79. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1) (2011). 
 80. In re Applications of the United States of America for Orders Pursuant 
to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 80 (D. 
Mass. 2007). 
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archived, and information to mean data.81  Finding that 
stored CSLI data recorded from a cell tower is a record and 
that CSLI data is information, courts have found that CSLI is 
a “record or other information.”82  While most courts agree 
that historical CSLI is obtainable under the SCA, there is 
disagreement over the standard of proof required. 
1. Standard of Proof: What Level of Proof Must Law 
Enforcement Show? 
Historical CSLI is available under § 2703(c)(1) only when 
law enforcement: (A) obtains a warrant, or (B) obtains a court 
order under § 2703(d) (a “section (d) order”).83  The  § 2703(d) 
standard of proof required for a court order under § 
2703(c)(1)(B) is: 
(d) Requirements for court order. A court order for 
disclosure . . . shall issue only if the governmental entity 
offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that . . . the records or other 
information sought, are relevant and material to an 
ongoing criminal investigation.84 
This standard is an intermediate standard, less than that of a 
probable cause, but more than required for a pen register or 
trap-and-trace device.85 
While the standard of proof for both wire communication 
and electronic communication is the same, there is good 
reason for the government and the courts to be careful about 
how the information sought is classified.86  Under the SCA, 
any communication from a “tracking device” is excluded from 
the definition of “electronic communication.”87  Section 3117 
defines a tracking device as: “an electronic or mechanical 
device which permits the tracking of the movement of a 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2011). 
 84. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2011) (emphasis added). 
 85. In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Directing 
a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 
304, 314 (3d Cir. 2010).  A pen register is a device or process which records the 
telephone numbers of outgoing calls.  A trap-and-trace device captures the 
telephone numbers of incoming calls.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)–(4) (2011). 
 86. See notes 87–89 and accompanying test (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 3117 
exception to the definition of electronic communication). 
 87. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(c) (2011). 
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person or object.”88 Therefore, if the “electronic 
communication” sought under § 2703(c)(1) is information 
derived from a device which “permits the tracking of 
movement of a person or object” that electronic 
communication cannot be obtained under § 2703(c)(1).89 
2. Legislative History: The Scope of the Stored 
Communications Act 
In 1994, Congress enacted the Communications 
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) which updated 
18 U.S.C. § 2703 to its current state.90  During Senate and 
House hearings for CALEA, then-Director of the FBI Louis 
Freeh testified regarding the purpose of the bill.91  Director 
Freeh stated that “[l]aw enforcement’s requirements set forth 
in proposed legislation include an ability to acquire ‘call setup 
information.’  This information relates to dialing type 
information—information generated by a caller which 
identifies the origin, duration, and destination of a wire 
communication, the telephone number or similar 
communication address.”92  When asked whether or not this 
information could be used to locate an individual, Director 
Freeh stated: 
Some cellular carriers do acquire information relating to 
the general location of a cellular telephone for call 
distribution analysis purposes.  However, this information 
is not the specific type of information obtained from “true” 
tracking devices, which can require a warrant or court 
order when used to track within a private location not 
open to public view.93 
The legislative intent of CALEA and the meaning of Director 
Freeh’s testimony has been the subject of debate for courts.94  
 88. 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2011). 
 89. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(c) (2011). 
 90. In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Directing 
a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 
304, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 91.  Louis J. Freeh, Director, F.B.I., Police Access to Advanced 
Communication Systems: S. J. Judiciary on Tech., Law, Civil and 
Constitutional Rights (Mar. 18, 1994), reprinted in Federal Document Clearing 
House, 1994 WL 223962 *33. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order 
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Some courts have interpreted Director Freeh’s testimony to 
mean that a warrant is required to obtain historical CSLI, 
while other courts have interpreted the testimony to say that 
a section (d) order is sufficient. 
D. Current Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides, 
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”95  In order to determine 
whether a search has taken place for the purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court held in United States 
v. Katz that there is a twofold analysis: first, did the person 
have an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and second, 
was that expectation one that society is prepared to recognize 
as objectively reasonable.96  The Supreme Court further 
elaborated that the home is a place where individuals have a 
subjective expectation of privacy that is objectively reasonable 
in the view of society.97  Because there is no Supreme Court 
authority directly on point, courts have analogized historical 
CSLI to other lines of cases.  One area of case law focuses on 
the disclosure of information to third parties, another area 
focuses on electronic surveillance through the use of 
“beepers,” and other courts have found the prolonged 
surveillance doctrine announced in United States v. Maynard 
persuasive. 
1. Assumption of the Risk: Third Party Disclosure 
Under the Fourth Amendment a “person has no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he 
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 
620 F.3d 304, 314 (3d Cir. 2010); In re Application for Pen Register and 
Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 763 
(S.D. Tex. 2005). 
 95. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 96. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).  
In Katz, government agents intercepted the contents of a telephone 
conversation by attaching an electronic listening device to a public telephone 
booth.  The Court found that Katz had a reasonable expectation of privacy while 
using the telephone booth and that the government’s activity of listening to and 
recording his words was a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id. at 353; see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979). 
 97. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
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voluntarily turns over to third parties.”98  The Supreme Court 
has found that where a person has voluntarily conveyed 
certain information to a third party, he or she has assumed 
the risk that the third party could disclose the information to 
law enforcement.99  For example, in United States v. Miller 
the Supreme Court found that the customer of a bank did not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the financial 
documents that he voluntarily conveyed to the bank.100  The 
Court found that the customer assumed the risk that those 
records could be accessible by the government, even if that 
information was revealed to the bank on the assumption that 
it will only be used for a limited purpose and in confidence.101 
Further, in Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court found 
that the user of a telephone had voluntarily conveyed records 
of telephone numbers dialed when calls were made, and 
therefore assumed the risk that those records would be 
revealed to the police.102  First, the Court distinguished Katz, 
stating that pen registers did not acquire the contents of 
communications.103  Second, the Court held that the telephone 
user had no subjective expectation of privacy because “[a]ll 
telephone users realize that they must ‘convey’ phone 
numbers to the telephone company, since it is through 
telephone company switching equipment that their calls are 
completed.”104  In addition, the user of the phone did not have 
an objective expectation of privacy because this expectation 
was not “one that society [was] prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’ ” 105  Whether the assumption of the risk doctrine 
applies to historical CSLI has been a subject of litigation in 
courts. 
2. Use of Electronic Surveillance to Track a Suspect: The 
Beeper Cases 
Other courts have sought guidance from the beeper cases 
to determine if a cell phone user has a reasonable expectation 
 98. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44. 
 99. Id. at 735, United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
 100. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744. 
 103. See id. at 741. 
 104. Id. at 742. 
 105. Id. at 743–44 (internal citations omitted). 
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 156 Side A      04/16/2012   17:10:32
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 156 Side A      04/16/2012   17:10:32
5_FRASER FINAL.DOC 4/11/2012  4:09:23 PM 
2012] HISTORICAL CELL-SITE LOCATION 589 
of privacy in his CSLI records.  The beeper cases concerned 
the use of tracking devices for surveillance purposes and 
whether they infringed upon a reasonable expectation of 
privacy and therefore constituted a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.106  In United States v. 
Knotts, the police used a radio transmitter, called a “beeper,” 
to track the movement of the suspect on public roadways.107  
The Court held that the defendant’s Fourth Amendment 
rights were not violated.108  The government surveillance 
conducted through the use of the beeper amounted to no more 
than following the defendant’s car on public streets and 
highways - an area where a person did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.109  The Court further added that the 
Fourth Amendment did not prohibit police from augmenting 
what they could normally have observed (the car on public 
streets) with the use of technology (the beeper).110 
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court imposed an 
important limitation on its holding in Knotts.111  In United 
States v. Karo, the government used a beeper in a similar 
fashion to Knotts by installing the device in a can of ether.112  
There, the Court found that the defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment rights had been violated because agents used the 
beeper to determine that the chemicals were inside the 
interior of the suspect’s home, an area where the suspect had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy.113  The Supreme Court 
found that the use of technology to gather information about 
the interior of the home distinguished the case from Knotts, 
as the information gathered in Karo could not have been 
visually verified.114  The beeper cases have led courts to 
consider two questions with respect to CSLI: is historical 
CSLI sufficiently analogous to a beeper for Knotts and Karo to 
control, and does historical CSLI invade the privacy of the 
 106. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 
460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 107. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281. 
 108. Id. at 281. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. at 282. 
 111. See infra Part I.D.3.  
 112. Karo, 468 U.S. at 708–09. 
 113. Id. at 714. 
 114. Id. at 715. 
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home? 
3. The Prolonged Surveillance Doctrine: Does the 
Duration of the Surveillance Matter? 
Recently, the D.C. Circuit issued an opinion that has 
been very influential in historical CSLI cases.  In United 
States v. Maynard, the police fixed a GPS tracking device to 
the defendant’s automobile without a warrant.115  In 
Maynard, the court did not concentrate on the location of the 
surveillance (roadways or the home), but instead focused on 
the duration of the surveillance.116  The D.C. Circuit 
concluded that Knotts was not controlling under the facts of 
the case, reasoning that in Knotts the Supreme Court 
distinguished between limited information obtained from a 
beeper (movements during a discrete journey), and more 
sustained and continuous monitoring, such as with the 
defendant in Maynard.117  The court found that the defendant 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz,118 
reasoning that his continuous movements—twenty-four hours 
a day over the course of twenty-eight days—were not exposed 
to the public.119  The court further held that the whole of one’s 
movements over the course of a month were not exposed to 
the public, because there was zero likelihood that anyone, 
including police, would observe all of those movements.120  
The court then reasoned that the entirety of defendant’s 
movements revealed more than each individual movement, 
and that the whole was therefore greater than the sum of its 
parts—the entire picture of defendant’s actions over the 
course of a month.121 
However, it is important to note that all courts have not 
accepted this doctrine.  In United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 
the Ninth Circuit declined to find the use of a GPS tracking 
device, used in a similar fashion to Maynard, was an 
 115. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (2010), reh’g en banc denied sub 
nom.; United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (2010), cert. granted 131 S. Ct. 3064. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 555–56. 
 118. Id. at 563–64. 
 119. Id. at 558. 
    120. Id.  
 121. Id. at 544.  
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impermissible search.122  “The only information the agents 
obtained from the tracking devices was a log of the locations 
where Pineda-Moreno’s car traveled, information the agents 
could have obtained by following the car.”123 
Using the assumption of the risk doctrine, the beeper 
cases, and the prolonged surveillance doctrine, courts have 
attempted to analyze whether law enforcement use of 
historical CSLI is a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment and therefore requires a warrant based on 
probable cause. 
E. Historical CSLI Case Law: The Search for a Statutory 
and Fourth Amendment Solution 
1. Early CSLI Jurisprudence 
In many historical CSLI applications, the court 
undertakes a two step analysis: (1) is historical CSLI 
obtainable under the SCA; and if so, (2) does the acquisition 
of historical CSLI require a warrant under the Fourth 
Amendment.  In the early discussion of CSLI, many cases and 
law review articles agreed that historical CSLI, as a “record 
or other information,” was obtainable under a § 2703(d) 
showing of “specific and articulable facts.”124  In some cases, 
historical CSLI was allowed under the statutory and Fourth 
Amendment framework even though prospective CSLI was 
denied.125 
Early historical CSLI cases largely found that the user of 
a cell phone did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
 122. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010), 
reh’g en banc denied, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 123. Id.  This decision was the subject of a scathing dissent by Chief Judge 
Kozinksi in which he evoked images of 1984’s Oceania.  Pineda-Moreno, 617 
F.3d at 1126 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
 124. See In re Applications of the United States of America for Orders 
Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 
79-80 (D. Mass. 2007); HON. JAMES CARR & PATRICIA L. BELLIA, 1 LAW OF 
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 4:84, ACQUISITION OF CELL SITE LOCATION DATA 
(Sept. 2011) (listing all of the early pro (d) order CSLI decisions).  See also supra 
note 14 and accompanying cases. 
 125. See In re Applications of the United States of America for an Order 
Authorizing Continued use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace with Caller 
Identification Device and Cell Site Auth. on Tel. No. (XXX) XXX-XXXX and any 
Subsequently Assigned Tel. No., 530 F. Supp. 2d 367, 368 (D. Mass. 2007). 
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under the “assumption of the risk” framework.126  A typical 
example is United States v. Suarez-Blanca, where the Court 
found that although a cell phone user might have a subjective 
expectation of privacy with respect to CSLI,127 this 
expectation of privacy was not objectively reasonable under 
the assumption of the risk doctrine.128  Further, these early 
CSLI cases did not find that the accuracy of surveillance 
conducted was sufficient to implicate the Fourth Amendment 
under Karo because CSLI did not indicate the location of 
defendants in the home or other private locations.129 
2. Current CSLI: Statutory and Fourth Amendment 
Challenges 
Historical CSLI began to receive greater attention in 
2008 when Magistrate Judge Lenihan authored the opinion 
that was the subject of appeal in the Third Circuit.130  In a 
rare showing of solidarity, the opinion was also signed by four 
other magistrate judges.131  Judge Lenihan’s decision found 
that historical CSLI could not be obtained without a showing 
of probable cause.132  That opinion and other historical CSLI 
decisions that found a showing of probable cause was 
necessary first concentrated on the tracking device exception 
to the definition of electronic communication under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3117.133  Some of these cases concluded that historical CSLI 
was information from a tracking device and therefore 
 126. See Suarez-Blanca, 2008 WL 4200156 at *8–9. 
 127. Id. at *8 n.7. 
 128. See id. at *8–9. 
 129. Id. at *11. 
 130. See In re Application of the United States of America for an  
Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to  
the Gov’t, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, (W.D. Pa. 2008), vacated 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
 131. Declan McCullagh, Feds Push for Tracking Cell Phones, CNET, (Feb. 11, 
2010, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10451518-38.html. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order 
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 
620 F.3d 304, 308-09 (3d Cir. 2010), In re Application of the United States of 
America for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and 
Trace Device; (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other Info.; and (3) 
Authorizing the Disclosure of Location-Base Services, 727 F. Supp. 2d. 571, 577 
(W.D. Tex. 2010). 
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 158 Side A      04/16/2012   17:10:32
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 158 Side A      04/16/2012   17:10:32
5_FRASER FINAL.DOC 3/15/2012  8:03:15 PM 
2012] HISTORICAL CELL-SITE LOCATION 593 
unobtainable under § 2703(c)(1).134  The application of § 3117 
to historical CSLI is discussed in Part II.A.3 but continues to 
be litigated in courts.135 
Other pro-warrant historical CSLI cases found the 
prolonged surveillance doctrine of Maynard persuasive in two 
contexts.  First, that Knotts is not dispositive on the issue of 
prolonged location tracking, and second, that a cell phone 
user has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her 
continuous movements over the course of a prolonged period 
of time.136  However, there are still other cases that found 
that historical CSLI is obtained under the assumption of the 
risk doctrine.137 
3. Third Circuit: The Sliding Scale Compromise 
Recently, the Third Circuit became the first United 
States Court of Appeals to address the issue of whether 
historical CSLI is obtainable under the SCA, and under what 
standard of proof.138  Rather than find that either a section (d) 
order or a warrant obtainable under a probable cause 
 134. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order: (1) 
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; (2) 
Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other Info.; and (3) Authorizing the 
Disclosure of Location-Base Services, 727 F. Supp. 2d. 571, 575 (W.D. Tex. 
2010). 
 135. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order 
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 
620 F.3d 304, 308–09 (3d Cir. 2010); In re Application of the United States of 
America for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and 
Trace Device; (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other Info.; and (3) 
Authorizing the Disclosure of Location-Base Services, 727 F. Supp. 2d. 571, 571 
(W.D. Tex. 2010). 
 136. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order 
Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information, No. 10-MC-0897, 
2010 WL 5437209, at *1 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2010); In re Application of the 
United States of America for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 838 
(S.D. Tex. 2010); see also In re Application of the United States of America for 
an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information, 736 F. 
Supp. 2d 578, 581–82 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d, (Nov. 29, 2010) (discussing in 
greater detail the application of the prolonged surveillance doctrine to historical 
CSLI by Judge Orenstein). 
 137. See, e.g., United States v. Benford, No. 2:09 CR 86, 2010 WL 1266507, at 
*3 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2010); United States v. Navas, 640 F. Supp. 2d 256, 264 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009), rev’d in part, 597 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 138. In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Directing 
a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 
(3d Cir. 2010). 
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 158 Side B      04/16/2012   17:10:32
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 158 Side B      04/16/2012   17:10:32
5_FRASER FINAL.DOC 3/15/2012  8:03:15 PM 
594 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
standard was sufficient, the court found that § 2703(d) 
created a “sliding scale” by which a magistrate judge could, at 
his or her discretion, require the government to obtain a 
warrant or a section (d) order.139  The court began by 
analyzing the language of § 2703(d), which states that a 
“ ‘ court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be 
issued by any court . . . and shall issue only if’ the 
intermediate [section (d)] standard is met.”140  The court 
found that the language “may issue” implied court discretion 
and that this implication was strengthened by the language 
“only if,” in the same sentence.141  The court reasoned that the 
words “only if” described a necessary, not sufficient, condition 
such that a showing of “specific and articulable facts” was 
necessary, but not automatically sufficient to grant a request 
for historical CSLI.142 
In addition, the court avoided the issue of whether 
historical CSLI was information from a tracking device under 
18 U.S.C. § 3117 and therefore exempt from the definition of 
an “electronic communication” by classifying the data as 
derived from a “wire communication,” which does not have 
the same tracking device exception.143  The Court reasoned 
historical CSLI requested by the government consisted of 
“records of information collected by cell towers when a 
subscriber makes a cellular phone call” and that the 
“historical record is derived from ‘wire communication’ and 
does not constitute an ‘electronic communication.’ ” 144 
Further, the court examined the legislative history of 
CALEA, the SCA and, more specifically, the testimony of 
Louis Freeh, and found that such testimony did not preclude 
providing CSLI under a section (d) standard.145  The court 
 139. Id. at 319. 
 140. See id. at 315 (emphasis in original). 
 141. Id. at 315–16.  
 142. Id. at 316.  The example given by the court is “a team may win the 
World Series only if it makes the playoffs;” a team meeting the necessary 
condition to winning the World Series, making the playoffs, does not guarantee 
that the team will win the World Series.  In contrast, “a team will make the 
playoffs if it wins its division;”  Id.  (“[W]inning the division is a sufficient 
condition to making the playoffs because a team that wins the division is 
ensured a spot in the playoffs.”).   
 143. Id. at 313. 
 144. Id. at 310. 
 145. In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Directing 
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instead found that the legislative history and Freeh’s 
testimony supported the notion that the new standard in 
1986 was an intermediate standard.146  The court reasoned 
that Freeh’s testimony focused on the government’s ability to 
obtain the information through a pen register or trap-and-
trace device, which was governed by a different, and lower 
standard than a section (d) order.147 
One of the most important developments to come out of 
the Third Circuit’s decision was the court’s outright rejection 
of the assumption of the risk doctrine.  The Court stated that  
“[a] cell phone customer has not voluntarily shared his 
location information with a cellular provider in any 
meaningful way,” reasoning that “it is unlikely that cell 
phone customers are aware that their cell phones providers 
collect and store historical location information.”148  However, 
the court ultimately did not find that there were sufficient 
facts to implicate the privacy of the home and thereby require 
a warrant under Karo.149  “There is no evidence in this record 
that historical CSLI, even when focused on cell phones that 
are equipped with GPS, extends to that realm [of the interior 
of the home].”150  Therefore, the court declined to find that 
historical CSLI by definition, required a probable cause 
showing in order to be obtained by law enforcement.151 
II. ANALYSIS: IS A WARRANT REQUIRED TO OBTAIN 
HISTORICAL CELL-SITE LOCATION INFORMATION? 
A. Statutory Framework: How is Cell-Site Location 
Information Classified and is a Section (d) Order Sufficient 
Currently the SCA is out of date and contains internal 
contradictions.152  Unclear legal standards, highlighted by the 
a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 
304, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 317. 
 149. See id. at 312. 
 150. Id. at 312–13. 
 151. Id. at 313. 
 152. See id. at 319; September Hearings, supra note 19, at 125 (Statement of 
James X. Dempsey, Esq., V.P., Center for Democracy and Technology). 
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Third Circuit’s “sliding scale” compromise,153 have led to 
confused magistrate judges attempting to interpret the 
statute, uncertain standards for government access to the 
information, and resources wasted on litigation of the issue.154 
1. Section 2703(d) “Sliding Scale”: Is a Showing of 
Specific and Articulable Facts Enough? 
As stated in Part I.E.3, the Third Circuit found that § 
2703(d) contained a “sliding scale” standard of proof whereby 
a judge or magistrate was permitted but not required to grant 
a request for historical CSLI under a section (d) order.155  
Focusing on the word “may,” the court and other advocates of 
this interpretation argue that the “sliding scale” is a 
“permissive” reading of § 2703(d), required by the statute’s 
plain language, the rule of constitutional avoidance, and 
Congress’ intent to provide courts with a statutory “safety-
valve” to avoid issuing orders that may violate the Fourth 
Amendment.156  Advocates of this interpretation argue that 
the statute contains the words “shall . . .  only if” rather than 
simply “shall . . . if,” which must mean that a showing of 
“specific and articulable facts” is necessary, not sufficient.157  
Otherwise, the statute would read: “[A] court order for 
disclosure . . . may be issued by any court that is a court of 
competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if” the [section (d)] 
 153. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order 
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 
620 F.3d 304, 316 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 154. See September Hearings, supra note 19, at 125 (Statement of James X. 
Dempsey, Esq., V.P., Center for Democracy and Technology). 
 155. In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Directing 
a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 
304, 316 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 156. Brief for Elec. Frontier Found. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Affirmance of the Dist. Ct. at 14.  In re Application of the United States of 
America for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose 
Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010) (No.08-4227), 2009 WL 
3866619 at *6.  The doctrine of constitutional avoidance states that where there 
are two possible readings of the statute, one of which could raise Fourth 
Amendment concerns, the other must be adopted so long as a reading of the 
statute is not plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.  See Ian James Samuel, 
Warrantless Location Tracking, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1324, 1337 (2008). 
 157. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order 
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 
620 F.3d 304, 315–16 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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standard is met.158  According to this view, in order for the 
word “only” to have meaning, it must be permissive and not 
mandatory.159 
The government and other advocates that believe a 
showing of “articulable facts” is sufficient concentrate on the 
word “shall.”160  First, advocates of this interpretation 
emphasize that the plain and unambiguous meaning of the 
statute should control.161  Further, advocates argue that § 
2703(d) does not mention, or even imply, that a probable 
cause determination may be required.162  Therefore, all that is 
required under § 2703(d) and the plain meaning of the statute 
is a showing of “specific and articulable facts.”163 
Next, these advocates state that the word “shall” is the 
language of mandate,164 and that any other reading 
emphasizing “may issue” in turn makes the words “shall 
issue” superfluous.165  Lastly, these advocates state that the 
“sliding scale” permissive reading of the statute ignores the 
overall purpose of section (d)—to allow the government to 
obtain non-content customer information without having to 
show probable cause.166 
In its opinion, the Third Circuit admitted that there is an 
“internal contradiction” in the statute and asked Congress to 
remedy the contradiction: 
[W]e are stymied by the failure of Congress to make its 
intention clear.  A review of the statutory language 
suggests that the Government can proceed to obtain 
records pertaining to a subscriber by several routes, one 
being a warrant with its underlying requirement of 
 158. See id. at 315. 
 159. See Brief for Elec. Frontier Found., supra note 156, at *1–3. 
 160. See Gov’t Reply Brief at 8, In re Application of the United States for an 
Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Ser. to Disclose Records to the 
Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010) (No.08-4227), 2009 WL 3866620 at *10. 
 161. See Brief for the United States at 23, In re Application of the United 
States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Ser. to Disclose 
Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010) (No.08-4227), 2009 WL 
3866618. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order 
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 
620 F.3d 304, 315–16 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 165. Gov’t Reply Brief, supra note 160, at *12. 
 166. Brief for the United States, supra note 161, at *23. 
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probable cause and the second being an order under 
§2703(d).  There is an inherent contradiction in the 
statute or at least an underlying omission.167 
This debate highlights the need for legislative change in the 
text of the statute.  Whether the legislature intended for a 
statutory “safety valve,” or instead intended for a section (d) 
standard to be sufficient, that intention should be made clear. 
2. Wire Communication vs. Electronic Communication: 
What Kind of Information is Cell-Site Location 
Information? 
A determination of whether historical CSLI is a wire 
communication or an electronic communication has serious 
consequences.168  Under § 3117, if historical CSLI is classified 
as an electronic communication, the data could be excluded 
from disclosure under § 2703(c)(1) because an electronic 
communication, as defined by the SCA, cannot be information 
derived from a tracking device.169  The problem is that 
historical CSLI could qualify as either a wire or an electronic 
communication. 
There are several reasons why historical CSLI could 
qualify as a wire communication.  First the definition of wire 
communication in the SCA includes the transmission of the 
human voice,170 whereas the definition of electronic 
communication does not.171  Further, because historical CSLI 
requests consist of records of information collected by cell 
towers when a user makes a phone call, the historical data 
derives from a wire communication.172  The legislative history 
of the definition of wire communication also bolsters this 
 167. In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Directing 
a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 
304, 319 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 168. See supra Part I.C–I.C.1. (discussing the exclusion of data from the 
definition of “wire communication” if that data can be classified as information 
derived from a tracking device under 18 U.S.C. § 3117). 
 169. 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2011). 
 170. Brief for the United States, supra note 161, at 17, n.13; 18 U.S.C. § 
2510(1) (2011). 
 171. See Brief for the United States, supra note 161, at 17, n.13; 18 U.S.C. § 
2510(12) (2011). 
 172. In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Directing 
a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 
304, 310 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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argument: “cellular communications—whether they are 
between two cellular telephones or between a cellular 
telephone and a ‘land line’ telephone—are included in the 
definition of ‘wire communications’ and are covered by the 
statute.”173 
However, CSLI could also qualify as an electronic 
communication.  An electronic communication is “any 
transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or 
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a 
wire, radio. . . .”174 Therefore, it is possible that CSLI is an 
electronic communication because it is not transmitted by “by 
the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection.”175 
While the specific language in the definition of electronic 
communication appears persuasive, it ignores the legislative 
intent of the definition of wire communication to include all 
cellular communications in the definition of wire 
communication.176  This Comment’s proposal, to separate the 
standard of proof for historical CSLI between “active use” and 
“idle use,” would help to clarify the distinction between wire 
communication and electronic communication.  Data 
transmitted during a call would constitute an “aural transfer” 
and would more comfortably fit within the definition of “wire 
communication.”177  On the other hand, idle use data, data 
transmitted by the network while the phone is idle, would 
more comfortably fit the definition of electronic 
communication.178 
3. Section 3117 Tracking Device: Is Your Cell Phone a 
Tracking Device? 
If CSLI is classified as an electronic communication 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) it must be determined whether a 
cell phone is a tracking device as defined by § 3117.  If so, 
CSLI would be excluded from the definition of electronic 
 173. S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 11 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 
3565 [hereinafter CALEA Hearings]. 
 174. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2011); see also Chamberlain, supra note 14, at 
1757 n.72. 
 175. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2011); see also Chamberlain, supra note 14, at 1757 
n.71. 
 176. See CALEA Hearings, supra note 173, at 11. 
 177. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2011). 
 178. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2011). 
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communication and therefore would not obtainable under § 
2703(c)(1).179  Perhaps best representing the belief that 
historical CSLI is excluded from disclosure under the SCA as 
information derived from a tracking device is Judge Andrew 
W. Austin who stated: “The bottom line is that cell phones 
undoubtedly have become ‘electronic . . . device[s] which 
permit[] the tracking of the movement of a person or object.’ 
They are tracking devices.”180  Even if one does not feel as 
strongly as Judge Austin, the definition of a tracking device 
as stated in the CALEA hearings in 1986, is very broad: 
These are one-way radio communication devices that emit 
a signal on a specific radio frequency. This signal can be 
received by special tracking equipment, and allows the 
user to trace the geographical location of the transponder. 
Such “homing” devices are used by law enforcement 
personnel to keep track of the physical whereabouts of the 
sending unit, which might be placed in an automobile, on 
a person, or in some other item.181 
In the above definition, there are no specific requirements 
regarding the accuracy of the device.182  Further, a device is 
covered under the above definition even if it was not intended 
or designed to track a person’s movements.183 
However, upon examination of the language of the 
statute and the traditional uses of a tracking device at the 
time the statute was enacted a cell phone may not qualify as 
such a device under § 3117.184  A true tracking device is 
 179. See supra Part I.C–I.C.1. (discussing the exclusion of data from the 
definition of “wire communication” if that data can be classified as information 
derived from a tracking device under 18 U.S.C. § 3117). 
 180. In re Application of the United States of America for an Order: (1) 
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; (2) 
Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other Info.; and (3) Authorizing the 
Disclosure of Location-Base Services, 727 F. Supp. 2d. 571, 580 (W.D. Tex. 
2010). 
 181. CALEA Hearings, supra note 173, at 10. 
 182. See id. 
 183. In re Application of the United States of America for an Order: (1) 
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; (2) 
Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other Info.; and (3) Authorizing the 
Disclosure of Location-Base Services, 727 F. Supp. 2d. 571, 578 (W.D. Tex. 
2010). 
 184. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order 
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 
620 F.3d 304, 308–09 (3d Cir. 2010); see also June Hearings, supra note 10, at 
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unknown to, and cannot be disabled or turned off by, the 
person being tracked.185  Also, subsection (a) of § 3117 states: 
“If a court is empowered to issue a warrant or other order for 
the installation of a mobile tracking device . . .”186 and refers 
to a tracking devices surreptitiously installed by the 
government, not devices already carried by the user.187  
Judges and commentators argue that the § 3117 exception to 
the definition of electronic communication applies only to 
those entities that explicitly provide tracking device 
services.188  Once an entity is a “provider of electronic 
communications” it must provide “records or other 
information” pertaining to its subscribers or customers,189 and 
entities that provide tracking device services in addition to 
other communications services are obliged to provide location 
data when the statutory prerequisites of § 2703 are met.190  
Other commentators argue the language of § 3117 above, 
indicating that a “warrant or other order”191 is required, 
implicitly authorizes the use of a section (d) order to acquire 
historical CSLI.192  Because the application of § 3117 is 
unclear, courts have sought guidance from the legislature 
history of the statute. 
4. Legislative History: The Scope of § 3117 
Courts have analyzed the legislative history of § 3117 
and more specifically Director Freeh’s testimony discussed in 
73–74 (statement of Marc J. Zwillinger, Zwillinger Genetski, LLP). 
 185. See In re Application of The United States for an Order: (1) Authorizing 
the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; and (2) 
Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or Cell Site Info., 411 F. Supp. 2d 
678, 681 (W.D. La. 2006). 
 186. 18 U.S.C. § 3117(a) (2011) (emphasis added). 
 187. See June Hearings, supra note 10, at 73–74 (statement of Marc J. 
Zwillinger, Zwillinger Genetski, LLP); In re Application of the United States for 
an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Information on a Certain Cellular 
Telephone, 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 188. See June Hearings, supra note 10, at 73–74 (statement of Marc J. 
Zwillinger, Zwillinger Genetski, LLP). 
 189. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2011). 
 190. See June Hearings, supra note 10, at 74 (statement of Marc J. 
Zwillinger, Zwillinger Genetski, LLP). 
 191. 18 U.S.C. § 3117(a) (2011) (emphasis added). 
 192. See In re Application of the United States for an Order for Prospective 
Cell Site Location Information on a Certain Cellular Telephone, 460 F. Supp. 2d 
448, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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Part. I.C.2.  On one hand, the 1994 Amendments to the SCA 
raised, rather than lowered, the standard of proof required to 
access non-content location information.193  This could 
constitute the intent of Congress to prevent disclosure of 
location information except under a probable cause 
standard.194  On the other hand the Third Circuit, found that 
in 1994—when the standard of proof required to obtain “call 
setup information” was raised—Director Freeh was 
discussing the standard of proof required for a pen register or 
trap-and-trace device, which is a lower standard than that for 
a section (d) order.195  Because Director Freeh was discussing 
a lower standard of proof than a section (d) order, by 
discussion of raising the standard of proof from its existing 
requirements, Freeh was referring to raising the standard to 
an intermediate standard—a section (d) order.196  This is a 
strong argument for which those advocates of a probable 
cause standard do not have a response.  Overall, it does not 
appear that the tracking device definition contemplated a cell 
phone or CSLI, a device that does not have to be installed, but 
rather contemplated the “beepers” used in Knotts and Karo.197 
Even if a court finds that historical CSLI is obtainable 
under the SCA, the court must also determine if that 
information is obtainable without a warrant under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
B. Fourth Amendment: Does a Cell Phone User Have a 
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in His Cell-Site Location 
Information? 
The majority of Fourth Amendment precedent concerning 
privacy and law enforcement surveillance was decided before 
the advent of devices like cell phones, which are deeply 
 193. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order 
Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and a Caller 
Identification System on Telephone Numbers [Sealed] and [Sealed] and the 
Production of Real Time Cell Site Info., 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 601 (D. Md. 2005). 
 194. See Chamberlain, supra note 14, at 1780–81. 
 195. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order 
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 
620 F.3d 304, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 196. Id. 
 197. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 705 (1984); United States v. 
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 276 (1983). 
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integrated into our daily lives.198  Location data generated by 
a cell phone does not comfortably fit into any Fourth 
Amendment line of cases: it is difficult to simply label the 
data “records” under the assumption of the risk doctrine, or to 
call a cell phone just a tracking device under Knotts or 
Karo.199  In fact, a cell phone is all of the above; it is a unique 
device that allows a user’s movements and approximate 
location to be recorded, but at the same time generates data 
that is stored by a third party provider in the ordinary course 
of business. 
1. Is There a Search Under Katz? 
In order for the Fourth Amendment to be implicated in 
law enforcement requests for historical CSLI, there must first 
be a search within the meaning of Katz: did the person have 
an actual subjective expectation of privacy, and was that 
expectation one that society is prepared to recognize as 
objectively reasonable?200  Because CSLI is “hidden, 
continuous, indiscriminate and intrusive” most cell phone 
users are unaware that CSLI is being collected by CSPs, but 
if they were, they would have a subjective expectation of 
privacy in this information.201 
From an objective standpoint, society holds special 
privacy expectations for telephones, including cell phones, 
and those expectations extend to historical CSLI.202  The 
 198. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 705; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 276; Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).   
 199. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the problems in analyzing data gleaned 
from a cell phone under the Knotts/Karo distinction). 
 200. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 201. Brief for Susan Freiwald as Amici Curiae Supporting the Dist. Ct. at 8–
9, In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Directing a 
Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 
(3d Cir. 2010) (No. 08-4227), 2008 WL 3861766; see In re Application of the 
United States of America for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen 
Register and Trap and Trace Device; (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber and 
Other Info.; and (3) Authorizing the Disclosure of Location-Base Services, 727 F. 
Supp. 2d. 571, 576 (W.D. Tex. 2010); see also In re Application of the United 
States of America for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site 
Information, 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 592-93 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 202. See In re Application of the United States of America for Historical Cell 
Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 845 (S.D. Tex. 2010); In re Application of the 
United States of America for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical 
Cell-Site Information, 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 587 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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Supreme Court in Katz based constitutional protection of 
telephone calls on the overriding importance of the telephone: 
“whatever people actually thought or knew about the privacy 
of their telephone calls, they were entitled to believe in the 
privacy of those calls, because any other result would be 
destructive of society’s ability to communicate.”203  Simply 
because the phone company or law enforcement could access 
historical CSLI, the privacy expectation is not diminished—
there is an expectation that those parties will not do so as a 
matter of course.204 
On the other hand, cell phone users, through experience, 
subjectively know that their location is disclosed to the 
CSP.205  “Any cell phone user who has ever had a call dropped 
due to a lack of service knows that their cell phone 
communicates with the nearest tower.”206  In addition, the 
Supreme Court has always assumed a high degree of 
awareness in the American public and thus, a lack of 
expectation of privacy—evidenced by the lack of reasonable 
expectation of privacy in such technologies as helicopter fly-
overs and high-powered cameras.207 
In Katz the Supreme Court emphasized a content/non-
content distinction in an objective expectation of privacy, and 
in Katz, it was the content of the communication which 
enjoyed an objective expectation of privacy, not the record 
associated with the phone call.208  As location-based cell phone 
services grow, public awareness of those services will grow as 
well, and the expectation of privacy will diminish 
accordingly.209 
 203. Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶ 29 (2007). 
 204. See In re Application of the United States of America for Historical Cell 
Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d  827, 845 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 
 205.  See In re Application of The United States for an Order: (1) Authorizing 
the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; and (2) 
Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or Cell Site Info., 411 F. Supp. 2d 
678, 681 (W.D. La. 2006). 
 206. Id. 
 207. See McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 435.  The Supreme Court found that 
there was not an expectation of privacy with respect to helicopter fly-overs in 
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 455 (1989) and high power cameras in Dow Chemical 
Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
 208. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361–362 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
 209. See McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 439–40. 
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 164 Side A      04/16/2012   17:10:32
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 164 Side A      04/16/2012   17:10:32
5_FRASER FINAL.DOC 3/15/2012  8:03:15 PM 
2012] HISTORICAL CELL-SITE LOCATION 605 
Altogether, it is important to note that the Katz test for a 
search has been criticized for both its circular reasoning and 
the unfettered discretion it gives to judges in deciding 
whether society objectively finds an expectation of privacy 
reasonable.210  Presumably, all defendants will assert that 
they had a subjective expectation of privacy, which, in effect, 
turns the entire Katz analysis into an evaluation of whether 
that expectation was objectively reasonable.211  However, 
Courts have not created a method to determine whether 
society deems an expectation of privacy to be reasonable or 
not.212  Further, if Katz is taken to its logical conclusion, the 
government could simply diminish reasonable expectations of 
privacy by “announcing half-hourly on television that . . . we 
were all forthwith being placed under comprehensive 
electronic surveillance.”213 
Recent case law such as United States v. Maynard shows 
how an individual can have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in non-content information like GPS data (or 
historical CSLI) that is continuously gathered over  
a prolonged period of time.214  The content/non-content 
distinction of Katz is not as useful when the non-content 
information gathered over an extended period of time has the 
potential to reveal an intimate picture of the user’s life.215  
Instead, this Comment proposes a reasonable expectation of 
privacy distinction based on whether the user has actively 
generated data that could convey his location through control 
of his phone or if the phone has generated the data without 
any activity or control by the user. 
 210. Freiwald, supra note 203, ¶ 21.  Having the word “reasonable” in both 
the name of the test and its definition has prompted some to criticize the test as 
circular:  reasonable expectations are reasonable.  Id. ¶ 21. 
 211. Id. ¶ 22. 
 212. Id. ¶ 23. 
 213. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 
MINN. L. REV. 349, 384 (1974). 
 214. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (2010), reh’g en banc 
denied sub nom.; United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (2010), cert. granted 131 
S. Ct. 3064. 
 215. Id. 
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2. Assumption of the Risk: Has a Cell Phone User 
Voluntarily Conveyed His Location? 
In addition to the Katz analysis, courts must also 
determine whether historical CSLI is obtainable under the 
assumption of the risk doctrine.  If a cell phone user is found 
to have voluntarily conveyed historical CSLI to a CSP, and 
therefore assumed the risk that his CSLI could be conveyed to 
law enforcement, that cell phone user would not have a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in his historical CSLI.216 
Because CSLI is generated automatically by the CSP 
network, the voluntary decision to use a cell phone cannot be 
equated with the voluntary conveyance of idle CSLI.217  
Further, the “choice” to use a cell phone in today’s society is 
really no choice at all, as many individuals are required to 
carry cell phones for work or other legitimate purposes.218  In 
addition, the substance of the records of CSLI are different 
from the records voluntarily conveyed in Miller and Smith in 
that the information is collected without the user’s 
knowledge, and the data provides the ability to track the 
user’s movements on a relatively precise and continuous 
basis.219  This is in contrast to other records accessible under 
the assumption of the risk doctrine (e.g. credit card, ATM, 
electronic toll collection systems) where it is clear to the 
person engaging in the transaction that the transaction was 
being recorded, and that transaction was only a specific 
moment in time.220 
At the same time, historical CSLI is a record or other 
information which is voluntarily conveyed to the CSP by 
virtue of the use of the cell phone, leading some courts to 
conclude that the user thereby assumes the risk that the 
CSPs will create its own internal record and turn over this 
information to the government.221  This argument focuses on 
 216. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 
425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
 217. See In re Application of the United States of America for Historical Cell 
Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 845 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 
 218. Chamberlain, supra note 14, at 1786. 
 219. See June Hearings, supra note 10, at 69–70 (statement of Marc J. 
Zwillinger, Zwillinger Genetski, LLP). 
 220. See id. 
 221. See United States v. Velasquez, No. CR 08-0730, 2010 WL 4286276, at 
*5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2010) (analogizing to Pineda-Moreno); Brief for the United 
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 165 Side A      04/16/2012   17:10:32
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 165 Side A      04/16/2012   17:10:32
5_FRASER FINAL.DOC 3/15/2012  8:03:15 PM 
2012] HISTORICAL CELL-SITE LOCATION 607 
the fact that cell phone records are maintained in the course 
of business, and, just like any other business, individuals do 
not have a subjective expectation of privacy in those 
records.222  In addition, other records, such as detailed bank 
and electronic commuter pass records that reveal the location 
of the consumer, are ordinarily obtainable with a court 
order.223 
The assumption of the risk doctrine fits comfortably 
within the framework proposed by this Comment.  If the 
phone is in active use, the CSLI accompanying that call is 
transmitted on the same frequency as the call itself and is 
information voluntarily conveyed to the phone company.224  In 
addition, when a user makes a call or answers a call he or she 
knows that that they have conveyed their location 
information in order to complete the call.  As the one court 
has insightfully stated, anyone who has had a call dropped 
knows that his cell phone communicates with the nearest cell 
tower.225  An implicit assumption in the knowledge that your 
cell phone is communicating with the nearest tower is that 
the cellular network knows the location of your phone, 
because it knows the location of the tower that your phone is 
communicating with.  Thus, when a cell phone user makes or 
receives a call, and knows that his phone is communicating 
with the nearest cell tower, he is aware that he has conveyed 
his approximate location to the CSP.  Further, similar to a 
credit card or electronic toll collection service,226 it is clear to 
the person generating active use data that the data is being 
recorded (for billing purposes) and the transaction occurred in 
States, supra note 161, at *28. 
 222. See United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 
WL 4200156, at *8–9 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008). 
 223. See June Hearings, supra note 10, at 61–62 (statement of Richard 
Littlehale, Assistant SAC, F.B.I.). 
 224. See McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 426. 
 225. See In re Application of The United States for an Order: (1) Authorizing 
the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; and (2) 
Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or Cell Site Info., 411 F. Supp. 2d 
678, 681 (W.D. La. 2006). 
 226. An electronic toll collection service provides an electronic pass that the 
user carries in his or her vehicle to automatically pay the toll as the vehicle 
passes through the toll booth.  Electronic Toll Collection Systems, U.S. GENERAL 
SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/104326. 
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only a specific moment in time.227  Because the cell phone user 
has voluntarily conveyed his location information to the CSP 
through the conscious physical act of making or receiving a 
call, he has assumed the risk that his location information 
could be turned over to law enforcement. 
Idle CSLI however, truly is information that is silently 
collected as an “automatic byproduct” of cell phone service 
and recorded without any affirmative act by the cell phone 
user, except that of turning the cell phone on.228  If the user 
wants to enjoy the purpose of his cell phone, to be able to 
make or receive calls, he must leave the phone on.  Further, 
most, if not all cell phone users are unaware that the cellular 
network is calculating their location information, because 
they have not taken any affirmative steps to convey that 
location to the CSP.  Under these circumstances a cell phone 
user has not voluntarily conveyed this information to the CSP 
and has an objective expectation of privacy in his or her 
historical CSLI. 
3. Electronic Surveillance: The Beeper Cases 
The Supreme Court established through its decisions in 
Knotts and Karo that the use of a beeper requires a warrant 
when private spaces (usually the home) are implicated, but 
not when the device is used to track a suspect’s movements in 
public areas.229  But, how important is the home/public spaces 
distinction when the “tracking device” is also a phone?  Under 
a strict reading of Karo, if historical CSLI may at times be 
accurate enough to implicate the home, historical CSLI 
requests should always require a warrant.230 
If an intrusion into a legitimate expectation of privacy 
takes place only once, or in limited bursts, it is still an 
intrusion, and it still requires probable cause under the 
 227. Cf. June Hearings, supra note 10, at 69–70 (statement of Marc J. 
Zwillinger, Zwillinger Genetski, LLP). 
 228.  See McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 426. 
 229.  See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984); United States v. 
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). 
 230. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order: (1) 
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; (2) 
Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other Info.; and (3) Authorizing the 
Disclosure of Location-Base Services, 727 F. Supp. 2d. 571, 579 n.15 (W.D. Tex. 
2010). 
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Fourth Amendment . . . there is nothing in any of the 
relevant statutes that makes a distinction between limited 
location information and fully robust, minute-by-minute 
location information.231 
Further, the uncertain nature of the accuracy of CSLI could 
require a warrant to avoid a constitutional violation, because 
the suspect may be unintentionally tracked in a private 
location.232  In addition, even if CSLI is not dependably 
accurate, a user who lives in a “palatial estate” still may have 
their privacy infringed if CSLI is accurate within even 100 
yards.233  Further, as CSLI becomes increasingly accurate,234 
it will cause historical CSLI to fall under the ambit of Karo, 
as that information will allow law enforcement to determine 
if a suspect is in his or her home.235 
However, currently CSLI is not consistently accurate 
enough to implicate the home of a suspect, but rather only 
indicates the general area where the call was made from, 
which may or may not give rise to the inference that the 
defendant was at home.236  Knotts and Karo make clear that 
acquiring location information about an object in the vicinity 
of the home or other private space, but not within its interior, 
is not a search.237  In Karo, in an incident separate from the 
agents’ use of the beeper to discover that ether was located 
inside the home of the defendant, the beeper was used to 
discover that the ether was located somewhere in a storage 
 231. Id. 
 232. See McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 441–42. 
 233. Chamberlain, supra note 14, at 1788. 
 234. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the increasing accuracy of CSLI as 
technology develops and more and more cell towers are erected). 
 235. See In re Application of the United States of America for Historical Cell 
Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 836 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 
 236. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order 
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 
620 F.3d 304, 312–13 (3d Cir. 2010) (concluding there were insufficient facts to 
implicate Karo); In re Applications of the United States of America for Orders 
Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 
80–81 (D. Mass. 2007) (concluding that historical CSLI reveals nothing more 
than what could be gleaned from a pen register); In re Application of the United 
States of America for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a 
Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, and (2) Authorizing Release of 
Subscriber and Other Info., 622 F. Supp. 2d 411, 418–19 (S.D. Tex. 2007)  
(finding that there was no risk of improper tracking for data from a single tower 
antenna). 
 237. See Brief for the United States, supra note 161, at 29. 
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facility.238  However, the beeper only indicated that the ether 
was somewhere in the facility, it did not indicate the specific 
locker where the ether was located.239  It was only after the 
agents used their sense of smell as they walked around the 
facility that they were able to detect in which storage 
container the ether was located.240  The Court found that this 
use of the beeper did not violate the Fourth Amendment 
because the beeper did not reveal anything about the contents 
of the storage locker and hence was not a search of the 
locker.241  This situation is similar, if not identical, to using 
CSLI to discover whether the suspect is in or near his 
home.242 
In addition, unlike in Knotts and Karo the alleged 
tracking device is not just a tracking device, but also a phone, 
and analogous to Smith v. Maryland and a pen register or 
trap-and-trace device.243  When a trap-and-trace device is 
installed in a suspect’s home phone, the suspect’s general 
location will be disclosed every time the phone is in use.244  
The government may not know where the suspect is within 
the home, but they will know that he (or someone in his 
home) is dialing from his home phone.245 
The analogy of a CSLI to a pen register seizes on an 
important distinction between the devices used in Knotts and 
Karo, and a cell phone.  An emphasis on the privacy of the 
home makes sense in the context of a tracker beeper that has 
no other uses except as a tracking device, but it makes less 
sense in the context of a device that has other functions, such 
as making phone calls, which might also be used to determine 
the location of a suspect.  There is little if any difference 
 238. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 720 (1984). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 720–21. 
 241. See id. 
 242. See In re Applications of the United States of America for Orders 
Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 
81 (D. Mass. 2007); Brief for the United States, supra note 161, at 29. 
 243. See In re Applications of the United States of America for Orders 
Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 
81 (D. Mass. 2007). 
 244. Id. 
 245. See In re Applications of the United States of America for Orders 
Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 
81 (D. Mass. 2007). 
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between determining that a suspect who lives alone is home 
when he uses his landline through a pen register or trap and 
trace, and determining that he is located within the home 
when he makes a call from his cell phone.  While there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the interior of the home, 
there is not a reasonable expectation of privacy in everyday 
manifestations that are observable from the street246 or from 
records that the party has assumed the risk will be conveyed 
to law enforcement.247  These observations or records can just 
as easily indicate whether or not a party is home. 
In addition, unlike the tracker beepers in Knotts and 
Karo, which indicated where an inanimate object was located 
in the home,248 law enforcement use of historical CSLI to 
determine whether a suspect is at home is no different from 
the use of other external manifestations which do not require 
a warrant.  In Karo the police were not attempting to discover 
if the suspect was at home, they were attempting to discover 
whether the suspect had something within his home.249  This 
is in contrast to the use of historical CSLI to determine 
whether a suspect is at home—law enforcement is not 
concerned with what is taking place or contained in the 
interior of the home, only that the suspect is there.  If, 
however, law enforcement uses historical CSLI to pinpoint 
where a suspect is located within the interior of his home, 
this use would violate the user’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy because traditional call data cannot be used for this 
purpose and neither can surveillance technologies without a 
warrant.250 
Further, in the context of the warehouse in Karo, there 
should not be a difference in Fourth Amendment protection 
for an individual who lives in a small, dense housing area, 
and one who lives in a “palatial estate.”251  However, as it 
currently stands, the suspect who lives in the dense housing 
area—where CSLI might indicate that he is at home or it 
 246. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984). 
 247. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979). 
 248. Karo, 468 U.S. at 714. 
 249. Id. 
 250. See id. 
 251. Compare Chamberlain, supra note 14, at 1788 with United States v. 
Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc denied, 617 F.3d 
1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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might indicate that he is in the common area of the complex 
(with no reasonable expectation of privacy)—and the suspect 
in the palatial estate—where the information would likely 
indicate that he was in the interior of his home—would have 
different Fourth Amendment standards apply.252  The tracker 
beeper cases simply do not carry over well to a tracking 
device that has other uses; there is a need for a different 
distinction in CSLI analysis.  Additionally, in United States v. 
Maynard, the Court found that the duration of the tracking is 
not addressed by the Knotts and Karo cases, which has 
become an important emerging issue.253 
4. Prolonged Surveillance Doctrine 
The prolonged surveillance doctrine announced in United 
States v. Maynard254 has recently been adopted by courts 
discussing CSLI and has offered an alternative analysis to 
the Knotts/Karo distinction.255  As stated in the June 
Congressional hearings: 
I mean, if I am continuously tracked everywhere I go all 
day, the fact that sometimes I am outside and sometimes I 
am inside doesn’t give me comfort that it was okay to 
track me during those moments I was outside . . . .  
It is not were you in the house at that moment?  It is are 
we learning something about your continuous movement 
versus learning something about you at a given moment in 
time . . . .256 
Advocates of the prolonged surveillance doctrine argue that 
the longer an investigation runs, the more likely that 
 252.   See Chamberlain, supra note 14, at 1788.  If the defendant were in a 
small dense area where the CSLI might only indicate that he was within the 
area of the apartment, this would appear to fall within the scenario of the 
warehouse in Karo, whereas if the defendant were in a large palatial estate, this 
would appear to fall within the holding of Karo and be an impermissible search.  
See Karo, 468 U.S. at 720. 
 253. See infra Part II.B.4 (discussing the implications of the prolonged 
surveillance doctrine on CSLI jurisprudence). 
 254. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 544 (2010), reh’g en banc 
denied sub nom.; United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (2010), cert. granted 131 
S. Ct. 3064 (2011). 
 255. See In re Application of the United States of America for Historical Cell 
Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d  827, 836–37 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 
 256. June Hearings, supra note 10, at 98 (statement of Marc J. Zwillinger, 
Zwillinger Genetski, LLP). 
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investigation will intrude upon a suspect’s privacy.257  
Further, they argue that the continuous nature of the 
surveillance distinguishes it from traditional methods used to 
track a suspect’s movements, such as purchase receipts and 
banking records or even police surveillance.258 
Opponents of the prolonged surveillance doctrine point 
out that there are differences between the facts of Maynard 
and CSLI that warrant attention.  In Maynard, GPS, a more 
accurate technology, was used to track the suspect and 
allowed for greater precision.259  In Maynard, the tracking 
device was attached to the suspect’s car, and was therefore on 
public roadways through almost the entirety of the 
“surveillance,” and the suspect’s movements were tracked in 
real time.260  In addition, one opponent of the prolonged 
surveillance doctrine stated: “Although continuous 
monitoring may capture quantitatively more information 
than brief stints of surveillance, the type of information 
collected is qualitatively the same.”261   
Further, the prolonged surveillance doctrine has been 
criticized for the vagueness that the doctrine introduces.262  At 
what point does surveillance become so prolonged as to have 
crossed the line into a Fourth Amendment violation?263  What 
effect might this doctrine have on police visual surveillance, 
for which a warrant is not required?264 
The difference between the GPS used in Maynard and 
CSLI, however, do not go to the heart of the issue: the 
duration of tracking and the entire picture of the suspect’s life 
 257. Freiwald, supra note 203, ¶ 69. 
 258. See June Hearings, supra note 10, at 98 (statement of Marc J. 
Zwillinger, Zwillinger Genetski, LLP). 
 259. In re Application of the United States of America for an Order 
Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information, 736 F. Supp. 2d 
578, 589 n.13 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 260. See id. at 595. 
 261. United States v. Sparks, 750 F. Supp. 2d 384, 392 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 262. See id. 
 263. See id.; cf. In re Application of the United States of America for an Order 
Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information, No. 11-MC-0113, 
2011 WL 679925, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011) (finding that while such line 
drawing is arbitrary, the need for such arbitrariness and its application is 
nothing new for law enforcement officers seeking to perform their duties 
without running afoul of their targets’ constitutional rights). 
 264. See id.; United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th  Cir. 
2010), reh’g en banc denied, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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learned from that tracking.265  In addition, while the logistical 
problems of the prolonged surveillance doctrine are real, the 
point that it makes about the intrusiveness of “whole picture” 
is also very real.  By examining the whole of a defendant’s 
movements over the course of time, the government is able to 
learn more about a suspect than they would were he only 
followed for one day—they learn the intimate pattern of his 
life.266  For this reason this Comment advocates that as long 
as historical CSLI is obtainable in active use under a section 
(d) order, that the duration of data obtainable be limited in 
time.  Requests for anywhere from sixty to one hundred days 
are too intrusive into the life of a suspect.267 
The active/idle use distinction proposed by this Comment 
would preserve and implement the prolonged surveillance 
doctrine of Maynard.  Active use data, obtainable under a 
section (d) order, would only include the limited instances in 
which a suspect dialed or received a call.  This data, unlike 
idle use data, is not continuous, as even the most frequent cell 
phone user is not on his phone twenty-four hours a day.  By 
limiting data obtainable without a warrant to the limited 
instances where a cell phone user makes or receives a call, in 
conjunction with a limit on the number of days over which the 
information can be obtained, this Comment’s proposal avoids 
the prolonged surveillance concerns of Maynard. 
 265. In re Application of the United States of America for Historical Cell Site 
Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 838 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 
 266. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 544 (2010), reh’g en banc 
denied sub nom; United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (2010), cert. granted 131 
S. Ct. 3064 (2011); see, e.g., Noam Cohen, It’s Tracking Your Every Move and 
You May Not Even Know, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2011,) http://www.nytimes.com 
/2011/03/26/business/media/26privacy.html (demonstrating the information that 
is generated through historical CSLI, including an interactive map). 
 267. See, e.g., In re Application of the United States of America for an Order 
Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information, No. 11-MC-0113, 
2011 WL 679925, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011); In re Application of the United 
States of America for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site 
Information, No. 10-MC-0897, 2010 WL 5437209, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2010) 
(reviewing an order requesting historical CSLI for 113 days prior to the date of 
the order); In re Application of the United States of America for Historical Cell 
Site Data,  747 F. Supp. 2d  827, 841 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (reviewing an order 
requesting historical CSLI and call detail records for sixty days prior to the date 
of the Order). 
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III. PROPOSAL 
Technology has outpaced existing statutes and Fourth 
Amendment Precedent, leading to conflicting legal standards 
that create uncertainty for law enforcement and courts.268  In 
addition, current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
governing the voluntary disclosure of records and other cases 
governing electronic surveillance does not assimilate well to a 
device like a cell phone, which both creates ordinary business 
records and allows for location-based surveillance.269  This 
Comment proposes a new legislative and Fourth Amendment 
distinction: active-use CSLI, data generated when the call is 
made (or received) and when the call is ended, would be 
obtainable under a section (d) order; whereas idle CSLI, data 
generated by the cellular network in order to locate the cell 
phone if and when a call is made, would be obtainable only 
under a probable cause standard.  This framework 
comfortably fits within the current existing definitions of the 
SCA, as the active/idle use distinction helps to resolve the 
issue of whether historical CSLI is a wire  
communication or an electronic communication.  Active use 
data, the data generated during the call,270 qualifies as a wire 
communication271 and idle use data fits the definition of  
an electronic communication.272 Further, this distinction 
preserves the existing tracking device exception to electronic 
communication.273  Application of the active use framework to 
the SCA can best be accomplished by legislation mandating 
that CSPs keep limited CSLI records and unlimited CSLI 
records separate and distinct.  Legislation regulating what 
kind of location information generated by cell phones can be 
stored and under what circumstances has been enacted by 
 268. See September Hearings, supra note 19, at 1–2; supra Part II.A 
(discussing the problems with the current statutory framework governing 
historical CSLI disclosure). 
 269. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the problems that are encountered 
when trying to fit CSLI into the Knotts/Karo analysis). 
 270. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 271. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (stating that a wire 
communication is an “aural transfer”). 
 272. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the distinction between wire 
communication and electronic communication). 
 273. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the tracking device exception to the 
definition of electronic communication). 
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other governments, most notably the European Union.274  
This legislation can provide the Legislature with a possible 
model to protect location information.275 
In addition, the active use framework tries to strike the 
appropriate balance in current Fourth Amendment precedent.  
The content/non-content distinction of Katz is not useful in 
the context of historical CSLI when the non-content 
information generated over a prolonged period of time has the 
potential to reveal an intimate picture of the cell phone user’s 
life and implicate a reasonable expectation of privacy under 
Maynard.276  Instead, the active use framework proposes a 
reasonable expectation of privacy distinction based on 
whether the user of the phone is actively conveying their 
location to the CSP by virtue of making or receiving a call, or 
if the phone has generated data without any control by the 
user. 
The active use distinction also helps to adapt the 
assumption of the risk framework to historical CSLI 
jurisprudence.  Active use CSLI, those records that the user 
actively generates by making and receiving calls, is more 
closely analogous to landline phone records that do not 
require a warrant under the assumption of the risk 
framework.277  However, idle use data which is silently and 
continuously collected by the cellular network without any 
action by the cell phone user would require a warrant as it 
more appropriately falls outside of the assumption-of-the-risk 
framework.278 
Also, the active use distinction tries to reconcile the 
holdings of Knotts and Karo with the fact that landline phone 
records can, and do, provide police officers with information 
regarding a suspect’s location.  Instead of analyzing a 
 274. See Directive 2002/58/EC, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the 
Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, 2002 O.J. (L 
201) 37–47. 
 275. See June Hearings, supra note 10, at 155–56 (statement of Electronic 
Privacy Information Center). 
 276. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari on Maynard.  The outcome of 
this decision could greatly shape CSLI jurisprudence as well. 
 277. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 735 (1979). 
 278. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the how CSLI fits into the assumption 
of the risk framework). 
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 170 Side A      04/16/2012   17:10:32
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 170 Side A      04/16/2012   17:10:32
5_FRASER FINAL.DOC 3/15/2012  8:03:15 PM 
2012] HISTORICAL CELL-SITE LOCATION 617 
reasonable expectation of privacy based on where the user is 
when the information is collected, this Comment proposes a 
distinction based on whether the user is actively controlling, 
or instead if the cellular network is gathering the user’s 
location information while the phone is idle   However, if law 
enforcement uses historical CSLI to pinpoint where a suspect 
is located within the interior of his home, this use would 
violate the user’s reasonable expectation of privacy under 
Karo because traditional call data or other police surveillance 
cannot be used for this purpose and neither can other 
surveillance technologies.279 
Lastly, this proposal finds the prolonged surveillance 
doctrine of United States v. Maynard persuasive and 
advocates for legislative changes that would curtail the 
window of time within which law enforcement could gain 
access to historical CSLI records, regardless of whether active 
or idle use.280  Active use data, obtainable under a section (d) 
order, would only include the limited instances in which a 
suspect dialed or received a call.  By limiting data obtainable 
under a section (d) order to instances in which the suspect 
dials or receives a call, the proposal of this Comment hopes to 
avoid the prolonged surveillance concerns of Maynard. 
This proposal strikes the appropriate balance sought by 
Congress.281  It balances the privacy of the user in his or her 
movements when not actively using their cell phone against 
the needs of law enforcement to build a case and gather 
information.  In addition, this framework provides a bright 
line rule for courts to follow; no longer must the court 
speculate how accurate the data is in order to determine 
whether or not the privacy of the home is implicated, or 
struggle with a statute that does not mesh with current uses 
of technology.282 
 279. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984). 
 280. See In re Application of the United States of America for Historical Cell 
Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 841 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (reviewing an order 
requesting historical CSLI and call detail records for sixty days prior to the date 
of the Order). 
 281.  See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text (discussing the goals of 
Congress in the recent hearings regarding the ECPA and communications 
technologies). 
 282. See supra Part II (analyzing the problems with the existing statutory 
framework and Fourth Amendment precedent). 
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A. Proposed Legislation: Amendments to the ECPA 
As stated above, in May 2011 Senator Leahy of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee introduced a bill in the U.S. 
Senate to update the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 
including the SCA.283  The proposed legislation, as currently 
written, would allow law enforcement to obtain historical 
CSLI under either a search warrant or a section (d) order.284  
A summary of the proposed changes prepared by Senator 
Leahy states that the new statutory language “codifies the 
government’s current practice for obtaining this kind of 
location information.”285 
Without more information, the exact implications of 
allowing law enforcement to obtain historical CSLI under 
either a search warrant or a section (d) order remain unclear.  
It is uncertain from the statutory language or the 
accompanying summary by Senator Leahy if the Third 
Circuit’s ruling that a finding of specific and articulable facts 
is necessary but not sufficient is still valid.  If the government 
has the necessary proof to meet the specific and articulable 
facts standard, must the court grant the government’s 
request, or can the court, in its discretion, require law 
enforcement to obtain a warrant? 
Additionally, although the proposed legislation may 
settle the current disagreement regarding the standard for 
law enforcement to obtain historical CSLI under the SCA, 
whether law enforcement is required to obtain a warrant 
under the Fourth Amendment would still remain unsettled.  
Recent decisions have denied government requests for 
historical CSLI not under the SCA, but the Fourth 
Amendment, either because historical CSLI can be accurate 
enough to implicate constitutionally protected privacy of the 
home under Knotts and Karo or under the prolonged 
surveillance doctrine of Maynard.286  The proposed legislation 
 283. Rachelle Dragan, US Senate Sinks its Teeth into Online Privacy Reform, 
TECHNEWSWORLD (July 7, 2011), http://www.technewsworld.com/story 
/72477.html. 
 284. Press, Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Leahy Introduces Benchmark 
Bill To Update Key Digital Privacy Law, SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY (July 16, 
2011) http://leahy.senate.gov/press/press_releases/release/?id=b6d1f687-f2f7-
48a4-80bc-29e3c5f758f2. 
 285. Id. 
 286. In re Application of the United States of America for Historical Cell Site 
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would not settle these issues and the Fourth Amendment 
implications of historical CSLI data will likely remain a 
subject of litigation in courts. 
B. Supreme Court Decision in United States v. Jones 
 The Supreme Court reached a decision in United States 
v. Jones (formerly Maynard) shortly before publication of this 
Comment.  The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, 
held that the Government’s installation of a GPS device on 
the defendant’s vehicle and the use of that device to monitor 
the vehicle’s movements was a search within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment.287  The Court reached this result by 
replying upon common-law trespass jurisprudence instead of 
applying the Katz analysis.288 
However, in dicta the Court discussed whether the 
Government’s use of a GPS device to monitor a defendant’s 
movements might also have violated the defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment rights under Katz.289  The small portion of 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion to discuss this issue focused 
on the duration of the tracking.290  Justice Scalia rejected any 
distinction between short-term and long-term GPS 
monitoring, stating that such analysis leads to “additional 
thorny problems.”291  
In his concurring opinion,292 Justice Alito indicated that 
under the Katz analysis he would hold that “relatively short 
term monitoring” of a person’s movements on public streets 
Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 838 (S.D. Tex. 2010); In re Application of the United 
States of America for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and 
Trap and Trace Device; (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other Info.; 
and (3) Authorizing the Disclosure of Location-Base Services, 727 F. Supp. 2d. 
571, 572 (W.D. Tex. 2010). 
 287. United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259, 2012 WL 171117, at *3 (S. Ct. Jan. 
23, 2012) 
 288. Id. at *3–4.  The Court in Jones stated that “[t]he Government 
physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.  
We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been considered a 
‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted”.  
Id. at *3. 
 289. Id. at *7–8. 
 290. Id.  
 291. Id.  
 292. The bulk of Justice Alito’s concurring opinion critiques Justice Scalia’s 
use of common law trespass jurisprudence instead of the Katz analysis to decide 
the issue.  Id. at *11–16 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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do not violate an individual’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy whereas longer term GPS monitoring would.293 
Justice Alito declined to create a standard for how long GPS 
monitoring must continue until it implicates a suspect’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy, stating that “[w]e need not 
indentify with precision the point at which the tracking of 
this vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed 
before the 4-week mark.”294 
Justice Sotomayor, who joined Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion but also wrote her own concurring opinion, took the 
strongest stance on the use of GPS devices to monitor a 
suspect.  Justice Sotomayor stated that she believed even 
shot-term monitoring could violate an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.295  She continued by expressing her 
belief that the low cost and wide availability of GPS trackers 
could have such a dramatic effect on American society so as to 
“chill[] associational and expressive freedoms.”296  Finally, 
Justice Sotomayor stated that “it may be necessary to 
reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to 
third parties,” on the grounds that the assumption of the risk 
framework was “ill suited to the digital age in which people 
reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third 
parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”297 
While it remains to be seen what the lasting effect of 
Jones will be, the Court’s narrow holding that the installation 
and use of the GPS device was a search provides little 
guidance on what the standard of proof should be to obtain 
historical CSLI records.  First, with respect to cell phones, the 
government does not have to install the device used to 
generate location information—the user is already carrying 
around his or her cell phone.298  Second, the Court did not 
explain what level of proof is required to conduct the “search” 
that occurred in Jones.299  The Court expressly declined to 
address the Government’s argument that the police officers 
 293. Jones, 2012 WL 171117, *17 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. at *9 (Sotomayer, J., concurring). 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. at *10 
 298. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 299. Jones, 2012 WL 171117, at *3–8. 
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had reasonable suspicion or probable cause to conduct the 
search on the grounds that the argument was not raised 
below.300  This has lead at least one commentator to wonder if 
the Court could later find that the search caused by installing 
a GPS device requires only reasonable suspicion.301  
Third, the court has not fashioned any of kind of 
standard as to when the monitoring of a person’s movements 
begins to impinge upon a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion attempts to make a 
distinction between short-term and long-term GPS 
monitoring, but then he declines to articulate a standard to 
differentiate between the two categories.  Justice Alito simply 
states that “the line was surely crossed before the 4-week 
mark.”302  Until many of the questions left open by Jones are 
answered, the Court’s decision may only add to the confusion 
and lack of clarity that currently persists in historical CSLI 
jurisprudence. The proposal for this Comment, to distinguish 
between active and idle use data, could help to provide a more 
discernable standard for when a warrant is or is not required 
for law enforcement to obtain historical CSLI records. 
CONCLUSION 
Cell phones have changed the way that people 
communicate with each other, but they also generate a 
wealth of personal information about where we have gone and 
to whom we have communicated with.  The current statutory 
framework for law enforcement access to historical CSLI is 
out of date, contains internal contradictions, and is presently 
the subject of litigation in courts.303  Additionally, existing 
Fourth Amendment precedent does not adequately balance 
the privacy expectations of users with respect to a device that 
both conveys their location and generates records in the 
ordinary course of business.  The result of these shortcomings 
is that courts have struggled to analogize historical CSLI to 
 300. Id. at *8. 
 301. Tom Goldstein, Reactions to Jones v. United States: The government 
fared much better than everyone realizes, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 26, 2010, 10:20  
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/01/reactions-to-jones-v-united-states-the-
government-fared-much-better-than-everyone-realizes/. 
 302. Jones, 2012 WL 171117, at *27 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 303. See supra Part III. 
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normal business records or to a tracking device, when in fact 
it is both. 
By proposing a new distinction between when the phone 
is in active use and when it is idle, this Comment hopes to 
provide a new, unambiguous legal framework that will help 
provide the legislature and courts with a test that adequately 
balances the privacy of the cell phone user with the 
reasonable expectations of society, and law enforcement’s 
need to protect the public.  As technology and its uses change, 
so must our statutes and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
 
